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If Ethanol is the Answer, What is the Question?
Peter Z. Grossman

SUMMARY:
Since 2005, in the face of rising oil and gasoline prices, many Americans have looked to plantbased fuels, particularly ethanol, as the "answer" to our energy dilemmas. ... Section III examines
the issues connected specifically to ethanol, how market forces as well as government subsidies
have worked to make corn-based ethanol economically viable at times, why that viability has
been lost in recent months even with subsidies, and further, why ethanol from corn on the scale
the legislation demands is impractical. ... Clearly it would be technically possible to produce the
mandated 15 billion gallons of ethanol, and distilling capacity will nearly reach that level shortly,
but the economics of corn-derived ethanol suggest that, absent massive subsidies or coercion,
this effort will not be economically sound for producers or consumers. ... (Indeed, high capital
costs are an issue for the mandated innovation of cellulosic ethanol, and part of the reason that
technology is not yet considered economically viable.) ... The federal subsidy is still 51 cents per
gallon, equivalent to $ 1.43 per bushel (assuming 2.8 gallons per bushel), although as noted
earlier there may be state subsidies as well. ... Major meat producing firms as well as users of
corn-based products such as high fructose corn syrup, have noted the impacts on their businesses
and in turn lobbied against fulfillment of the larger corn ethanol mandates.
I. INTRODUCTION
Since 2005, in the face of rising oil and gasoline prices, many Americans have looked to plantbased fuels, particularly ethanol, as the "answer" to our energy dilemmas. n2 In fact, President
George W. Bush and many members of the U.S. Congress are among those who believe that
ethanol is the "answer." In December 2007, Congress passed, and President Bush signed, a new
energy bill. n3 This bill, which amended the 2005 Energy Policy Act, n4 was notable for two
particular provisions. The first was the mandate for automakers to increase the corporate average
fuel efficiency (CAFE) standards of their auto fleets to thirty-five miles per gallon (mpg) by
2020. n5 This represented a 40 percent increase over the previous standard set in the 1970s. n6
[*150]
But the far more dramatic mandate concerned a government requirement that by 2022, 36 billion
gallons of transportation fuel would be provided by biofuels, particularly ethanol. n7 Of that total,
15 billion gallons are to be distilled from corn, a target to be reached by 2015, while the
remaining 21 billion gallons, must be derived from cellulosic plants such as switch grass. n8 In
all, this measure would mostly satisfy President George W. Bush's goal of "20 in 10," that is the
reduction of U.S. consumption of conventional automotive fuels by twenty percent in ten years.
n9
The bill merely extends the term to fifteen years and, if fulfilled, would substitute between
fifteen and twenty percent of projected fuel consumption. n10
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The size of the mandate is actually quite staggering. Under current production methods, about
half of America's corn crop will be needed to reach the 2015 target, and the celluslosic
component cannot be produced today at a cost remotely competitive with gasoline. In fact, the
cellulosic mandate depends on technological advances that can be described today as, at best,
remotely "plausible." n11 Moreover, the infrastructure to distill such a vast amount of ethanol
does not exist, nor do the vast fields of crops like switch grass that will be needed as ethanol feed
stocks. Thus, the mandate does not simply require the development of workable technology, but
also its usage on a truly massive scale. Nevertheless, ethanol, the "renewable energy revolution,"
as one member of Congress termed it, n12 is seen as a feasible substitute for petroleum-based
fuels that will provide a home grown alternative to petroleum imports.
But the optimism about ethanol is unfortunately an example of hope over experience. There is
little reason to think that these benchmarks will be met on time. Indeed, if history is any guide,
there is reason to doubt that this mandate [*151] will ever be achieved. n13 The ethanol "answer"
in fact seems less like the technology of the future and more like other promised solutions of the
past. n14 It may well only be the answer to the question: what is the latest government-backed
failed energy panacea? From nuclear fission power to synfuels to electric automobiles to nuclear
fusion power, government programs have touted, and more often than not mandated, a new
marvelous technology that would provide the answer to our energy dilemmas. But in every case,
the mandated technology has failed to deliver. Often, in fact, the effort has entirely failed. For
example, nuclear fusion development was promised $ 20 billion toward the goals of proving by
1990 that nuclear fusion energy could produce more (electric) energy output than the heat energy
that was put in and creating a fusion power commercial prototype facility by 2000. n15 Funding
was scaled back but none of these benchmarks have ever been met. n16
Nuclear fission power, on the other hand, is perhaps the most successful alternative energy
technology undertaken under the auspices of the federal government. But even that technology,
which proponents claimed would provide almost limitless power at a price "too cheap to meter,"
has never fulfilled its promise. n17 Even in 2008, more than forty years after the first nuclear
fission power plant was constructed, new nuclear power plants cannot be built anywhere in the
world without government subsidies and loan guarantees. n18
Yet the sorry history of government energy programs did not enter into the debate that led to
passage of the 2022 biofuels mandate. Enthusiasm for the mandate was overwhelming with
many politicians chiding President Bush for his timidity in requesting only a 35 billion gallon
target. n19 Yet there is every reason to believe that ethanol will not make a major contribution to
our energy supplies [*152] by 2022, if ever. It is unlikely that it will be technically feasible to
produce such an enormous volume of cellulosic ethanol, and it may well be damaging
economically to even try. n20
This paper is structured as follows: Section II looks back at past alternative energy technology
programs and explains why the search for a panacea technology is at the heart of so many of
them and why the management of technological progress that they entail misconceives the nature
of innovation. Section III examines the issues connected specifically to ethanol, how market
forces as well as government subsidies have worked to make corn-based ethanol economically
viable at times, why that viability has been lost in recent months even with subsidies, and further,
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why ethanol from corn on the scale the legislation demands is impractical. It also explores the
economic issues connected to alternative means of ethanol production. Section IV concludes the
paper with a brief consideration of what role, if any, government should play in fostering new
energy technologies.
II. THE POLICY CONUNDRUM AND THE PANACEA TECHNOLOGY
Over the last 30 years, Congress, usually at the President's behest, has repeatedly passed
legislation mandating, usually with a timetable, the development of alternative energy
technologies. n21 Yet as noted above, not a single mandate has been fulfilled, and in fact,
alternative energy mandates have achieved little, if any, value whatsoever. Despite this dismal
record, in 2007 the ethanol mandate was passed by both houses of Congress. n22
The motivation behind these mandates is not blindness to historical precedent. Rather it stems
from a policy conundrum that can only be solved if a [*153] mandate such as the one for ethanol
is fulfilled. Basically, the president and Congress face the following problem: Americans
generally want to achieve two objectives from energy policy. The first goal is energy
independence, that is, independence from energy imports. The second is a low price for energy
resources. The conundrum arises because these goals are mutually exclusive. Given our current
resource mix, the way to achieve independence from energy imports would be to raise prices
considerably. On the other hand, the way to lower energy bills would be to remove taxes,
increase refinery capacity, and drill for more oil and gas both in the United States (where there
clearly would not be sufficient resources extractable at low prices to keep consumers' prices low)
and elsewhere. Indeed, we would encourage exploration and imports from all sources, especially
ones where extraction costs would be low.
But in theory there is one way around this conundrum: the panacea technology, the new
technology that could provide nearly limitless domestic energy at relatively low prices. n23 Since
only a new technology can resolve the contradiction inherent in the goals, Congress is motivated
to mandate one "answer" after another.
Probably the best known mandate of the past was the Carter-era program for synthetic oil and
gas (known as synfuels) passed in 1980, and for the most part, shuttered in 1985. n24 Essentially,
the mandate directed that synfuels would be derived primarily from America's abundant coal
resources. That is, solid coal would be extracted and then processed into both liquid (syn-oil) and
gaseous (syn-gas) forms. The technology to do this had been demonstrated many years before
but it was very expensive to produce, much more costly than conventional oil and gas extraction
and production. Proponents argued that if the government devoted very large funds to the
development of those synfuel processes, the technology would soon become cost competitive
with conventional oil and natural gas. This would be especially likely since the supplies of
conventional resources were thought to be rapidly running out, n25 which would make
conventional gasoline [*154] and diesel fuel extremely expensive. Originally, the synfuels
program was to receive eighty-eight billion dollars in government funds channeled through a
government corporation, The Synthetic Fuels Corporation (SFC) with a goal of producing fivehundred thousand barrels a day of synthetic oil (or gaseous equivalent) by 1987, and two million
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barrels per day (equivalent) by 1992. n26 With that quantity, synfuels would have provided the
equivalent of nearly twenty percent of our transportation fuels by 1992. n27
The synfuels project of course was a complete fiasco. It was predicated on steadily rising prices
of conventional fuels (they instead fell) and progress in technological development (which was
not forthcoming). When the SFC was closed in 1985, it had accomplished very little (one syngas
plant was in operation and its output was not cost competitive). n28 The synfuels program overall
had wasted about $ 2 billion. n29
Despite the dismal and well-publicized failure of the synfuels mandate, new mandates were
passed both during and after the closing of the SFC. In 1990, California passed its own mandate,
declaring in 1990 that, by 2003, 10 percent of all cars sold in the state would have to be zeroemission vehicles [*155] (ZEV). n30 It was thought that this effort would spur development of
electric vehicles in particular, but in fact the mandate was continually pushed back over the
ensuing thirteen years and is nowhere close to being realized as of early 2008. n31
Similarly, in 1993 the Clinton Administration launched a $ 1.5 billion effort to create a
commercially practicable prototype of an eighty-mile-per-gallon automobile, a program known
as the Partnership for a New Generation of Vehicles (PNGV). n32 The mandate called for the car
to be developed by 2004 through a partnership of the three major U.S. automakers (GM, Ford,
and DaimlerChrysler) with government funding. n33 By 2001, it was clear that the goal would not
be achieved, and the new Bush Administration abandoned the effort. n34 Moreover, with the real
(inflation adjusted) price of transportation fuels very low, there was no particular reason why
automakers would invest heavily in such a project, even if the technology seemed to be in sight.
In fact, the opposite was occurring among U.S. automakers that were focusing on the
development of large, fuel-inefficient sport utility vehicles and selling them by the millions.
It is important to consider just what assumption the government is making (at least implicitly)
when it issues a technology mandate. In all the above cases, the government was necessarily
taking a position on the nature of technological innovation. Most importantly, a technology
mandate assumes that innovation is demand-led. That is, if consumers want something that is not
physically impossible to produce (such as a perpetual motion machine), then entrepreneurs will
produce it, provided the incentives are correct. If they are not correct, then there is a "market
failure" that must be corrected by government intervention. n35
[*156] Or, to put it more concretely, consumers have wanted a substitute for foreign oil.
Synfuels should have provided that substitute, but for some reason entrepreneurs were not
developing it. Perhaps they saw the investment as too risky, or they felt they could not capture
the tremendous gains that society would enjoy from this new technology. n36 But since the
market was not providing consumers with what they demanded, government had to step in to
correct this market failure to deliver.
Some scholars over the years have argued that innovation may be demand-led, n37 but in general
the evidence overwhelmingly points to a supply-side explanation. Innovation occurs not because
consumers want a new technology. The way the process actually works is: first, innovation
occurs in a way that is not generally predictable; and second, the market determines whether
people want the result of that innovation at the price entrepreneurs will offer it. As one of the
4

leading historians of technology Nathan Rosenberg has argued, scientific knowledge evolves if
not randomly, at least unevenly, and its employment in the creation of marketable products is
unpredictable. n38 Thus, it cannot actually be said that there was a market failure in the case of
alternative energy technology, or that the market had in fact underprovided what consumers had
demanded. Rather, the converse appears to be more likely. That is, there was an unrealistic
expectation that government would be able to substitute not only for market interaction but also
for knowledge acquisition and its consequent development. As the discussion of past
governmental efforts suggests, government programs simply have not produced marketable
energy products. Arguably in fact, technology policy has revealed not the existence of market
failures but rather the persistence of government failures. n39
Of course there are examples of technological progress induced by government. The Apollo
program achieved a remarkable demonstration of technology in putting astronauts on the moon.
Indeed, presidents and pundits have repeatedly conjured the memory of the Apollo program in
advocating alternative [*157] energy development. n40 But the Apollo program (or the
Manhattan Project as another example frequently raised with respect to energy development) did
not have the same intent that is placed on an alternative energy program. Both projects were
mere demonstrations (spectacular ones at that) in which initial and ongoing costs were largely
irrelevant. In fact, ongoing costs were meaningless in the Apollo case because after a few
demonstrations the program was terminated. Alterative energy technologies, on the other hand,
are supposed to compete, often on a massive scale, with conventional resources. Virtually all of
the mandated technologies, like synfuels, had already been demonstrated. n41 The process for
turning coal into a liquid fuel has been known since 1909, and we have had prototype electric
cars for many years as well as experimental autos that have achieved more than 100 miles per
gallon. But none of these technologies have ever proven price competitive with conventional
technologies, notwithstanding government subsidies and mandates.
It should be noted that proponents do point to some successes in government induced
technological change that are, in some sense, economically viable. n42 The basic category is
termed in the literature as "technology forcing," and appears to have had notable success with
regards to the 1970 Clean Air Act. n43 Most especially, automakers were presented with a
demand that they reduce tailpipe emissions from cars, and were told that they needed to do so by
a certain [*158] date or face EPA sanctions. n44 The result was the catalytic converter, a
technological advance that would probably not have occurred without the "forcing" process of a
technological mandate. n45 Thus, we have an example of technology that was created by a
mandate and is now "commercial."
Clearly, this is a different kind of commercial from that which faces an alternative energy
technology. The catalytic converter did not have to compete with an existing, lower cost
solution, nor did it have to substitute for some other kind of converter. Moreover, there were
potential penalties if it, or something like it, was not created. To make alternative energy
technology analogous, imagine a case whereby a car owner faced punitive action if she used
conventional fuels, or a home owner if he failed to install solar panels on his roof. Further,
assume these penalties would exceed the additional cost of adopting synfuels or solar heating.
Coercion would in fact make any uneconomic technology "viable," but there has not been any
suggestion to date to require the use of ethanol over gasoline, especially if the latter is cheaper.
5
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Thus, even mandated "successes" do not really provide an example to demonstrate that
government action can correct the supposed market barriers that impede innovation.
There are two other assumptions that the government implicitly makes in the context of an
alternative energy technology mandate that are also open to question: first, if a technology works
but is not being exploited, government support is a sufficient condition to make it economically
viable; and second, once it is viable, widespread adoption will ensue. But these assumptions are
not supported by either theory or fact. No one can foretell if an innovation will lead to a market
success. The process of development of a product is not the same as the process of
commercialization. The former is an engineering problem. For example, can we make a solar hot
water system that will efficiently capture the heat from the sun? It is generally the case that an
innovation will follow a process from an idea, to laboratory proof of that idea, to a prototype
demonstration, to large scale engineering development, and then to commercial introduction. n47
As [*159] in an Apollo moon landing where the government can assemble scientific and
technical minds to examine problems, the Department of Energy can no doubt gather engineers
to build a state-of-the-art solar hot water system, with incorporated improvements both in the
quality of the instruments and the manufacturing process.
But will the resulting effort produce a solar hot water system that will enjoy market success?
Will people buy it? How will the market respond? Market success has been aptly described as an
"emergent phenomenon," n48 as opposed to an engineering one. Price, and other forms of
information that convey a product's desirability and attributes, will emerge from buyer-seller
interactions. How these evolve will determine market success. If the products prove unreliable or
too costly given their alternatives, success will not emerge, regardless of the state-of-the-art
technology.
Moreover the process of adoption, even where market penetration is emerging, is likely to
proceed over time - sometimes leading to market success on a large scale. To continue this
hypothetical example, consumers may perceive that solar heating is apparently cost competitive
with conventional heating technologies, but how well does it perform over time? What are the
long run maintenance costs? How reliable are vendors with respect to repair and service? Some
people may adopt the technology quickly, but for others it may be years, even decades, before
adoption occurs. n49 The adoption process may be thought of to follow an S-curve (see Figure 1),
where the y-axis shows the level of market penetration, along an x-axis representing time. The
broken line at the top of the figure represents the point of market saturation. But how long it
takes to go from the small market share of early adoptions at the left of the graph to saturation is
uncertain. It could be years or decades. Also, it could not occur at all. A technology may make
some initial penetration but lose out to alternatives as information grows and choices become
clear.
Solar hot water heating demonstrated this. Incentives from the Carter Administration developed
a nascent solar hot water heating industry in the late 1970s and early 1980s. Carter officials
envisioned large and rapid market growth, projecting 2.5 million installed solar units by 1985. n50
However, the market signaled something else to consumers; vendors were proving unreliable and
[*160] the prices of conventional fuels, contrary to expectations, fell. When incentives were
finally eliminated, an estimated ninety-five percent of all solar producers and contractors went
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out of business, and by the 1990s, more solar hot water systems were being removed from homes
than were being added. n51 By 2000, the technology had only a miniscule percentage of the hot
water heating market and little likelihood of any major expansion. n52 In this instance, as in all
the others, the government failed to convert a fully engineered alternative energy technology
product into something that was commercially practicable.
Figure 1
Market Saturation FIGURE 1
(see original for figure)
There is a corollary to the assumption that government intervention is a sufficient condition in
bringing innovations in energy to the market: that is, if there is more than one process, more than
one design, more than one idea, government has the expertise to pick the best design and thus,
direct social resources to their highest valued use. But governments around the world have had a
relatively poor record in choosing between the competing technologies. The Japanese
government, often hailed for its industrial policies, did have some success at promoting existing
Japanese firms in industries with well-understood, mature technologies. In steelmaking, the postwar Japanese industry had notable successes [*161] and benefited from government support.
But when Japan's government sought to make Japan a leader in high definition television, it
supported the development of an analog technology that failed in the marketplace (even though it
was an engineering triumph). n53 Of course, with respect to alternative energy technology, the
U.S. government is confronted with a dilemma: given the enormous size of the mandate, if the
government fully backs multiple standards and approaches because the cost would quickly
become enormous.
Then again, government is by definition ill-suited at picking winners. While markets pick from a
range of choices with competition threatening to alter the prospects for any given product and
any given firm, the government often picks winners based on political considerations. The best
lobbyist could succeed in winning government approval over what might be a better
technological or marketable idea. n54 By its nature, a government program that is able to spend
literally tens of billions of dollars creates an incentive more for rent-seeking than for
technological innovation. Every alternative energy program has attracted proponents of
technologies seeking a share of the large benefits, often willing to make extravagant claims that
are impossible for bureaucrats and legislators to accurately evaluate.
Yet there are also political incentives for politicians to endorse technology mandates whether the
prospects for success are high, or whether the lawmakers even understand the ideas they are
promoting. When a politician declares that we will have energy independence by a certain date,
they seem bold, Kennedyesque. Since fulfillment of the mandate is typically years in the future,
there is little cost to a politician to vote for it or enthusiastically endorse it. n55 The timetable of
greater concern is the next election cycle, and chances are that even if legislators are still in
office when the mandate expires, there will be a new issue of paramount concern to their
constituents, and the mandate vote will shrink in importance, if not be entirely forgotten.
[*162]
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III. ETHANOL AND ITS PROSPECTS
A. Ethanol Mandates
"Everything about ethanol is good, good, good," Senator Charles Grassley (R-Iowa) said at the
opening of an Iowa ethanol plant. n56 Grassley's paean to ethanol has been echoed by many
politicians, some courting votes during presidential primaries, others supporting farm
constituents, one of the beneficiaries from ever increasing ethanol subsidies.
The U.S. government has supported ethanol to at least a limited extent since the 1970s by
providing tax exemptions or direct subsidies for producers. n57 But two pieces of legislation in
the 1990s gave major boosts to ethanol production. In 1990, the Clean Air Amendments called
for additives to gasoline to "oxygenate" fuel; that is, additives had to contain compounds with
oxygen molecules that would make motor fuels cleaner burning and less polluting. n58 Ethanol
was one of those additives, and the legislation spurred increased production and blending of
plant-derived alcohol fuel. However, difficulties in transporting ethanol discouraged its use as an
oxygenate outside of the Midwest. n59 Two years [*163] later, President George H. W. Bush
signed into law the Energy Policy Act of 1992 which set a goal of replacing thirty percent of
conventional fuels used in cars and light trucks with alternatives by 2010. n60
By the early 2000s, as a consequence of these two pieces of legislation, U.S. ethanol producers
were distilling 1.7 billion gallons of ethanol, most of it for blending into gasoline. n61 While this
amount replaced less than two percent of U.S. automotive fuels, it represented almost double the
production in 1990. n62 The oxygenation rules called for gasoline blends with less than 10 percent
of the oxygenate. But often ethanol has been blended with gasoline at a ratio of 1:9, sometimes
called "gasohol," and more often referred to as E-10, meaning that the mixture is 10 percent
ethanol and 90 percent gasoline. n63 This amount actually represents an important ceiling because
ethanol can be corrosive at higher concentrations, damaging conventional automobiles parts.
This problem did not become a major issue with respect to ethanol because blending of ethanol
was limited and production remained almost entirely localized.
But with rising fuel prices in the 2000s, President George W. Bush and supporters of ethanol in
Congress sought a new mandate. The proposal, originally offered in 2002, called for production
of 5 billion gallons of ethanol by 2012. n64 This basic policy mandate was finally achieved in the
2005 Energy Policy Act. n65 In fact, the new law went beyond the original proposal by mandating
4 billion gallons by 2006 and 7.5 billion gallons by 2012. n66 These mandates were instituted
along with rule changes that ended compulsory oxygenation of fuel, thus eliminating the
previous reason for subsidizing ethanol. Now the rationale for the mandate was the broader issue
of "energy independence." Ethanol was to play a role more like the one synthetic gasoline was
supposed to play, replacing a [*164] substantial portion of imported oil. By this time the direct
federal ethanol subsidy was 51 cents per gallon. n67
It should be noted that before, as well as after, the Energy Act of 2005 was passed state
governments were passing mandates of their own. n68 Most notably, Minnesota mandated that all
gasoline sold in the state was to be E-10 effective at once, and that by 2013, all gasoline would
need to be 20 percent ethanol or E-20. n69 The second part of this mandate is problematic as
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suggested above, since all cars using E-20 would need to be retrofitted to prevent corroding
effects from the higher alcohol content. n70 It has been pointed out that car warranties would be
voided if motorists use E-20 in existing vehicles. n71
The federal mandate, however, immediately spurred investment in, and construction of, ethanol
facilities. Virtually all of these were designed to produce ethanol from corn. By 2007, there were
134 ethanol distilling plants in the United States, with production capacity of over 7 billion
gallons; also another 77 plants were under construction, which would add another 6 billion
gallons capacity when, or if, they are completed. n72
In December 2007, the mandate was expanded once again with the Energy Independence and
Security Act of 2007. n73 Now the mandate required production of a colossal 36 billion gallons of
ethanol by 2022, with the prescription that [*165] 15 billion gallons be distilled from corn, and
21 billion from cellulosic feedstocks. n74 Though switch grass has been noted (especially by
President Bush) as a possible feedstock, it is yet unclear just what cellulosic ethanol would, or
should, be made from. Wood chips, cornstalks, and other cellulosic plant materials have been
suggested. n75 Given the uncertainties surrounding not just the technology but also the basic input
that is to produce 60 percent of the mandate, the 2007 energy bill effectively has repeated the
process of a legislated demand for innovation. Though cellulosic ethanol can be produced, it is
far more costly than the corn-derived product and has not been produced on a large scale. n76
Success in making this form of ethanol economically viable is definitely open to question.
But what of the corn side of the mandate? Clearly it would be technically possible to produce the
mandated 15 billion gallons of ethanol, and distilling capacity will nearly reach that level shortly,
but the economics of corn-derived ethanol suggest that, absent massive subsidies or coercion,
this effort will not be economically sound for producers or consumers. Ethanol produced under
the mandate is unlikely to be cost competitive with conventional gasoline, and at the same time,
it will raise food and land prices. In general, the corn ethanol mandate is probably no more likely
to solve our energy dilemmas than any previous panacea.
It should be noted at the outset, that while corn ethanol production of 15 billion gallons seems
like a huge quantity, it would not even meet the national E10 standard. That is, it would replace
less than 10 percent of projected automotive transportation fuels. Ultimately some proponents of
ethanol would like to see a national effort to mandate E-85 or a blend of 85 percent ethanol and
15 percent gasoline. However, that amount would require production at such a vast scale that it is
wildly implausible. To understand why, consider that if 100 percent of the 2006 (record) corn
crop of 10.5 billion bushels were used for ethanol, we would get a bit over 28 billion gallons of
fuel (assuming conversion was at an efficient level), which is only about 75 percent of the 2022
mandate. We could also plant another 20 million acres, an area the size of South Carolina, in
corn to get us approximately to the 36 billion gallon level. Even using switch grass, if the
technology proves commercially practicable, we will need to use very large tracts of land. To get
to E-85, we would need to quadruple the proposed ethanol level, and land use, of the 2022
mandate! An attempt to make all gasoline E-10 [*166] will have important and problematic
economic consequences; therefore, E-85's consequences can barely be imagined.
B. The Basic Economics of Corn Ethanol
9

Ethanol will be considered an economically viable product when it satisfies two basic
requirements. First, it must be cost effective to produce, meaning that the market price of ethanol
is greater than (or at least equal to) the cost of production. Second, it must be cost effective to
purchase; the price must be comparable to the alternative, namely conventional gasoline. This
will be especially true for those consumers who contemplate purchasing modified automobiles so
that they can use blends up to E-85. That said, there are a number of complicating factors in
analyzing the economics of ethanol. For example, even if production and consumption of ethanol
make economic sense at current output levels, will costs rise as production increases? Or put
another way, would a national E-10 standard, or something like it, mean that per unit costs of
ethanol will be greater than small-scale production. Will costs remain constant, or even fall? In
some instances, mass production leads to economies of scale so that increased output leads to
declining costs and lower prices. But at other times increased production leads to diseconomies
of scale, that is, with costs rising as the scale of output increases. Moreover, even if it is
profitable to replace conventional gasoline with ethanol, and it is cost effective for consumers to
choose it, there may be other economic factors in the development of ethanol that would work
against (or possibly for) large scale production. For instance, it has been argued that there will be
spillover effects from substantial production of corn ethanol that will raise various social costs
and so effectively lower overall social welfare.
In general, the economic viability of ethanol - where it is profitable to produce and cost effective
to consume - depends on three factors: the price of gasoline, the price of corn, and the size of
government subsidies. Other factors may impact the viability of ethanol as well. For example,
the capital cost of constructing ethanol facilities will be an ongoing charge in ethanol production.
n77
(Indeed, high capital costs are an issue for the mandated innovation of cellulosic ethanol, and
part of the reason that technology is not yet considered economically viable.) There will also be
operation and maintenance costs as well as benefits [*167] from selling the ethanol production's
dry residues (distillers' grains) for animal feed.
We can think of the problem this way: the ethanol producer earns a profit when the cost of
making a gallon of ethanol (average cost) is less than, or equal to, the price he or she receives for
it. n78 The cost of making a gallon of ethanol includes the variable costs of plant operation,
capital costs, and so on, which can also be represented as a certain cost per gallon of ethanol
produced. Of course this also includes the cost of the key input, corn. Typically the ethanol yield
from a bushel of corn is 2.6 gallons (although often 2.7 or even 2.8 per bushel are used in
calculations since this is the output level that has been achieved by stateof-the-art producers). n79
There is also revenue in the form of government subsidies. The federal subsidy is still 51 cents
per gallon, equivalent to $ 1.43 per bushel (assuming 2.8 gallons per bushel), although as noted
earlier there may be state subsidies as well. n80
One 2005 study from the U.S. Department of Agriculture determined average production costs at
41 cents per gallon inflation adjusted to 2007 this would be 43.5 cents, and while there will be
variation across producers, the technology is well known and the differences will be minimal. n81
One must assume a rate of return on an investment, which we can call the opportunity cost of
producing ethanol, instead of producing some other product. A 20 cent/gallon return has been
suggested. n82 Thus, total costs not including corn inputs are 63.5 cents/gallon. Since subsidies as
well as production costs are assumed to be the same across producers and constant, the truly
10

uncertain variable cost is the price of corn. Corn input costs are undoubtedly the crucial element
in the calculation. Not only are current prices relevant but future ones are as well. Though futures
[*168] markets indicate the future price of corn, they are imperfect predictors and do not
account for bad harvests, increased plantings, and so on. n83 But, once we have calculated the
cost per gallon of ethanol (and hence the floor for its price in the market since any lower price
would be loss creating) we need to add the subsidy and then compare that to the wholesale price
of gasoline.
At first glance, it may seem unsurprising that over the past decade ethanol and gasoline have
often sold for comparable prices per gallon; in June 2007, for example, the former was $
2.13/gallon, the latter was $ 2.17/gallon. n84 But in fact price equality should not be expected
because ethanol has only about 70 percent of the energy value of gasoline and presumably
should be selling at a steep discount to conventional fuels. Since prices are often close, it has
been assumed that ethanol has worth as an additive (termed its additive value), n85 presumably
that additive value is as an oxygenate, over and above its energy content. Thus, it may logically
sell for something close to the price of gasoline, possibly even above that price. n86 Some energy
economists will assume an additive value of at least twenty cents. n87 It is, however, difficult to
make assertions about additive values because until 2006, oxygenating additives were required
by law and could be replaced, not by gasoline, but rather by alternate oxygenates (such as
MTBE) and would be utilized if it were (a) selling at a price above cost, and (b) selling at or
below the price of MTBE. Under these circumstances, if ethanol's price is at a premium to its
energy value, as well as a premium to gasoline, ethanol will be economically viable to produce as long as it does not have to directly compete for consumer dollars where non-blended gasoline
could be offered as an alternative. In fact, it can be assumed that whether or not ethanol will be
utilized in gasoline blends, absent a mandate requiring its use, will depend on whether balancing
the total cost plus the subsidy package makes the ethanol price competitive with the alternative,
unblended gasoline. n88 Thus, if the price of corn is low [*169] and/or the price of gasoline is
high, ethanol is more likely to be economically viable; also, if subsidies were to increase,
viability would benefit. Of course the supply of ethanol relative to its demand will determine its
market price.
With each of the market-determined variables - ethanol, gasoline, and corn - there will be price
ranges that make ethanol production either profitable or not. There is in effect a limit on these
prices for all producers, which may be referred to as the break-even level, that is, price
movements of these variables as they change may make ethanol either a profit-making or lossmaking activity. It can go from profit to loss quite quickly.
Perhaps the key price for the economic viability of ethanol is the price of corn because corn
prices have been the most volatile of any of the three. Consider where corn prices have been over
the past two years and where they are expected to be in 2009. As Figure 2 shows, at the end of
2005, the price of corn was around $ 2/bushel, and in early 2006 it was only marginally higher,
around $ 2.15. n89
Figure 2- Corn Prices - Chicago Board of Trade 1999-2007
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(see original for figure)
[*170]
So if we assume that in early 2006 the price of the corn input was 77 cents per gallon ($ 2.15
divided by 2.8), then variable production costs were 63.5 cents, and overall a gallon of ethanol
could have been produced for around $ 1.405/gallon. We can also subtract several cents per
gallon, representing the amount recouped by the producer in selling dry residue distillers' grains
for animal feed. n90
It is also important to take account of the lower energy content of ethanol. As noted, ethanol has
only about 70 percent the energy per gallon as a gallon of gasoline, so in order to compare
ethanol and gasoline prices on a per-unitof-energy basis, we need to multiply the wholesale price
of ethanol by 0.7. n91 In early 2006, the wholesale price of gasoline was around $ 1.75 and
ethanol was approximately $ 2.00, but strictly on an energy basis ethanol should have been
selling for $ 1.40/gallon. n92 If we subtract the subsidy from the actual price, ethanol would have
been selling for $ 1.49, nine cents above its energy value and considerably over its net cost. n93
Under these circumstances ethanol was highly profitable and had a presumptive additive value of
26.5 cents. n94 The price of corn made this especially lucrative. In fact a quick calculation
suggests that at that time, early 2006, ethanol would still have been cost effective to produce
even if the price of corn had been about $ 4.75 per bushel; that is, given the prices of ethanol and
gasoline, the break-even price required corn at $ 4.75 per bushel. n95 If the corn price was higher
than that, ethanol would not have been cost effective. A price below $ 4.75 meant profits for
ethanol producers, and the lower that price was, the higher the profits.
[*171]
Just how movements in prices of corn, gasoline, and ethanol could affect the profitability of
ethanol production and cost effectiveness of ethanol consumption was observed less than two
years later in the fall of 2007. At that time, the price of corn had risen to almost $ 4 per bushel,
n96
but the price of ethanol was falling due to the onrush of new production that had produced a
glut of supply. By September 2007, the ethanol price was only $ 1.55 in some locations. n97
Surprisingly, despite rising prices of crude oil, the wholesale price of gasoline in October was
only $ 2.02. n98 At these prices, the break-even price of corn, even with the subsidies, could have
been no higher than about $ 3.50. With prices at $ 4 per bushel by October, ethanol plants in
various parts of the country were suddenly stopping production, and in some cases declaring
bankruptcy. n99 Suddenly, the additive value was negative 37 cents.
By January 2008, the market situation had changed but the prospects for ethanol still were
unfavorable. The price of ethanol had recovered to $ 1.85 per gallon, but the price of corn kept
rising, and was over $ 4.50 per bushel by the end of the month. n100 Futures markets were
projecting about $ 5 per bushel by March 2008, and $ 5.25 per bushel in 2009. n101 Clearly, at
these prices, ethanol could not be profitable. At prices below $ 2 per gallon, ethanol was "price
competitive" for consumers to purchase in early 2008, only because its price was essentially
below cost, and gasoline prices were over $ 2.30. Obviously, producers could not continue to sell
unless the price of ethanol rose, the cost of corn fell, or the subsidies increased. But under the
circumstances expected at that time ($ 5 per bushel and a 51 cent subsidy), for ethanol to have
been profitable and price competitive with gasoline, ethanol would have needed to sell for about
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$ 2.10 per gallon. n102 The market was then also pessimistic about the price of gasoline with
respect to ethanol. In January, futures markets were predicting falling gas prices by late 2008 and
2009. n103 If correct, the predictions would mean that corn ethanol will [*172] have increasing
difficulty competing in the near future. n104 Moreover, as farmers and ethanol producers attempt
to fulfill the 15 billion-gallon mandate, it is hard to imagine that the price of corn will fall. With
the doubling of production to around 8 billion gallons, the price of corn more than doubled. If
production nearly doubles again, barring the planting of literally millions of additional acres in
corn, the price of corn will make its ethanol prohibitively expensive, even at E-10. Certainly
futures markets are already suggesting the price trajectory is substantially upward and the
prospects for ethanol are unfavorable.
C. Other Economic Considerations
There are several economic issues that complicate any discussion of the costs and benefits of
corn ethanol. The most obvious problem is the impact on the price of food. Not only are prices of
corn-based products rising, but the demand for corn for ethanol has also increased the prices of
corn substitutes such as soybeans (also at very high levels), and the prices of major products that
use corn (especially animal feed), which in turn has increased the prices of meat products. As
noted above, distillers' grains from ethanol production provide some animal feed at relatively
low prices. But the increase in corn and soy prices have generally impacted meat producers and
raised meat, dairy, and egg prices. n105 Major meat producing firms as well as users of corn-based
products such as high fructose corn syrup, have noted the impacts on their businesses and in turn
lobbied against fulfillment of the larger corn ethanol mandates. n106 From mid 2006 to the spring
of 2007, the average American paid an estimated $ 47 extra, or about $ 14 billion in all (and this
does not include the direct taxpayer ethanol subsidies), because of the rising prices. n107 The
pressure on the price of U.S. corn has had impacts beyond America's borders. In Mexico
consumers rioted over high tortilla prices, in Indonesia they rioted over soybean prices, and in
China there have been "grumblings" over pork prices that rose by 29 percent in 2007 due to the
[*173] rising costs of corn which had been diverted to China's own ethanol project. n108
According to studies by the International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI), global food
prices are likely to rise, especially for staples such as wheat and cassava (substitutes for soy and
corn). n109 The consequences could be grave for the world's poor. One estimate suggests that as a
result more than a billion people will face greater risks of famine and malnutrition. n110
There may also be problems for some farmers with respect to rising land values. The price of
agricultural land is the net present value of the expected return from that land. With prices of
agricultural products rising, so are land prices. Iowa farmland, which had increased 57 percent
between 2000 and 2005, rose an additional 22.6 percent in 2007 alone. n111 In fact prices were up
more than 12 times what they had been in 1986 at the end of the protracted farm crisis that began
in the 1970s. n112 Although this benefits existing landholders, anyone buying acreage today is
depending on the high prices of corn to continue and rise further. If the ethanol mandate is
reduced, or if cheaper ways to make ethanol (other than corn) are developed, there could again
be a farm crisis with bankruptcies throughout the farm belt.
One other cost of ethanol bears mentioning: the potential environmental cost. Although ethanol
was developed in part to reduce tailpipe emissions from cars, there have been many articles
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recently about the demands ethanol production places on groundwater as well as on ethanol plant
pollution. n113 Exactly how large these costs might be are unclear, but their presence casts even
greater uncertainty on the economic viability (as well as desirability) of massive ethanol
production.
[*174]
D. The Economics of Alternative Means of Ethanol Production
The ethanol mandate of 36 billion gallons presupposes technological progress on cellulosic
ethanol, which would be made from woodchips, switch grass and cornstalks, among other
sources. n114 The process, basically the large scale application of enzymes to break down
cellulose into sugars, has been demonstrated at a cost that shows the technology is not yet close
to economic viability. n115 In his State of the Union Address in 2007, President Bush suggested
that breakthroughs in cellulosic ethanol were near, n116 but even proponents of this technology
see its economic viability by 2012 as feasible with at best "plausible technology developments."
n117

Most observers are far less optimistic, even if the technology does in principle bring costs down
to economically viable levels - at least at modest-sized production. To reach the mandate in the
fifteen year timetable, an area the size of Kentucky will have to be planted with switch grass (or
some other feed stock), and a huge infrastructure of distilleries, storage facilities and so on need
be constructed. n118 Moreover, no one knows what kind of environmental impacts the technology
will create. The process will entail utilization of thousands of tons of organic compounds which
will need handling and disposal. It is considered highly unlikely that, barring a major
technological breakthrough, the United States will produce anything close to 22 billion gallons of
cellulosic ethanol by 2022. n119
[*175]
Another alternative production technology would be to use sugarcane as a feedstock. Brazil
produces over 4 billion gallons of ethanol per year using sugarcane and does so at a low cost of
production and a high yield of ethanol per ton of cane. n120 But a USDA analysis suggested that
the United States would be unable to match Brazil's low cost of production and indeed would not
be able to produce sugarcane or sugar beet ethanol at a cost per gallon less than that of ethanol
from corn. n121 Also, the amount of sugarcane and sugar beets grown in the United States would
produce a relatively small amount of ethanol, and expansion of cane and beet plantings on a
massive scale would not be practical. n122 In the meantime, the United States has effectively
limited imports of low cost Brazilian ethanol by imposing a 54 cent per gallon tariff. n123 An
effort to repeal the tariff with an eye toward greater diversification of energy supplies was
thwarted in 2007 and seems unlikely to be revived. n124
It would be a mistake to assume, however, that Brazilian ethanol imports would have a
significant impact on U.S. mandates. Even if Brazilian production were doubled and all of the
additional quantity shipped to the United States, the supply would provide only about 10 percent
of the 2007 mandate's requirements. Furthermore, if Brazil were to attempt such large scale
increases in production, there would be consequences in sugar markets as well as on Brazil's
environment. n125 Consider that the ethanol yield from Brazilian cane fields is about [*176]
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double the amount that can be achieved per acre from a U.S. cornfield. n126 However, to get 4
billion more gallons, that is, double the current output, Brazil would have to plant an additional
60 million acres (an area the size of Michigan). n127 Prices of sugar are also likely to rise the
more that sugar is devoted to ethanol. Indeed world sugar prices doubled from 2006 to 2007 and
increased ethanol production would only send these prices soaring ultimately to the point of
reducing Brazil's ability to produce at low costs. Though Brazil has plans of increasing its output
and exporting much of the increase, Brazilian sugar-derived ethanol is no more an "answer" than
is U.S. corn ethanol. Therefore, there is no ethanol process we know of that can cost effectively
produce the vast quantity of fuel called for in the 2007 U.S. energy bill.
IV. CONCLUSION
Corn ethanol will almost certainly not prove an economically viable solution to America's energy
dilemmas, especially if production is increased to the levels required by the 2007 mandate.
Alternative means of producing ethanol are not economically viable either. As it did in the past,
the U.S. government has mandated innovation that it cannot actually bring into fruition. Yet this
mandate is touted by officials as a lynchpin of American energy policy, and will be the recipient
of billions of dollars in subsidies unless the mandate is repealed, or at least reduced. n128 Though
the idea of ethanol as energy panacea continues to be voiced, ethanol is not going to be the
means (as too many people have come to believe) of achieving something like "energy
independence." n129
However, since ethanol is most unlikely to lead to any answers to our energy dilemmas, what
should our government policy be? With respect to ethanol, [*177] it is clear that the mandates
misdirect resources and incentives. The mandate should be repealed, as should the subsidies. If
ethanol can compete with gasoline, as it has been able to at times over the past few years, then it
does not need tax payer funding. If it can't compete, it should not be marketed. To the extent that
ethanol provides benefits by diversifying our sources of supply, the tariff on Brazilian ethanol
should be repealed as well. n130
As for cellulosic ethanol, a case can be made that government research funding of promising
ideas could be useful. Even partial funding (or tax benefits) for demonstration plants might be an
application of resources that will pay off sometime in the future. n131 But to expect, indeed to
require by legislation, a huge cheap supply of fuel from an unproven technological process is not
just unrealistic, it is truly wasteful. It channels incentives to one possible new technology and
effectively away from others that could prove more promising and viable much quicker than
cellulosic ethanol.
In general, there needs to be a recognition that technological development is uncertain and
cannot be created by government decree. If there are breakthroughs, entrepreneurs will surely
take them to market. But the process of innovation and commercialization cannot be controlled
by the visible hand of the politically motivated state.
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